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PREFACE 
For nearly three decades, mergers, acquisitions, and tender 
offers have figured prominently in the news. More recently, 
these transactions have aroused a great deal of concern 
among business leaders, economists, stockholders, social 
observers, and the media. New legislation and regulatory 
changes affecting these transactions are now being consid-
ered at various levels of government. 
Many of the issues raised by mergers and acquisitions are 
addressed by this survey which tabulates and discusses the 
responses of 217 corporate directors to phone interviews and 
a mailed questionnaire. The questions elicited directors' 
opinions on merger activity, the reasons for its recent high 
levels and its probable future direction; on the merger 
decision and the parties and interests that affect it; on the 
tactics used by target companies, their banks and investment 
bankers; on the harm and benefit produced by mergers; on 
the regulation of mergers; and on the experience of the 
respondents themselves. 
This survey continues a series of Touche Ross business 
opinion studies. Other studies in the series are "Business 
Executives on Nonprofit Boards," "The Changing Nature 
of the Corporate Board," and "Fortune 500 Chief Executive 
Officers' Opinions on Tax Reform." Touche Ross business 
opinion studies are shared with the business and financial 
community, opinion leaders, government officials, and the 
business press. 
HIGHLIGHTS 
Of the findings yielded by the survey, these were particularly 
significant: 
• The main reasons for the upsurge of mergers in recent years 
are low stock prices (cited by 88 percent of the respondents) 
and a weakened U.S. dollar (62 percent). Data and discussion 
p. 9. 
• However, 70 percent of the respondents expect merger 
activity to decrease in the coming years. Data and discussion 
p. 14. 
• The major deterrent to mergers, say 72 percent, is the 
difficulty of finding good acquisition candidates. Thirty-nine 
percent see a prime deterrent in unfavorable economic condi-
tions such as high interest rates. Data and discussion p. 11. 
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• Sixty-nine percent reject the widely held belief that poorly 
managed companies are especially attractive takeover 
targets. An overwhelming majority name the following 
characteristics as those which make a company an attractive 
acquisition candidate: a major product line in a rapidly 
growing market (91 percent), excellent management (84 per-
cent), and a dominant market position (78 percent). Data and 
discussion p. 12. 
• Ninety-five percent of the respondents say that the interests 
of stockholders as a group should receive significant consid-
eration in the target company's merger decision, but 22 
percent report that stockholder interests get only some 
consideration or none at all. Top management, on the other 
hand, does get significant consideration according to 58 
percent of the respondents, but only 33 percent believe that 
this much consideration is warranted. Data and discussion 
p. 18. 
• Despite many calls for representatives of employees other 
than top management, minorities, and community interests 
on corporate boards, 89 percent of the respondents oppose 
such representation. Data and discussion p. 19. 
• The best reasons for fighting a takeover bid, say a majority 
of the respondents, are to elicit a higher bid (54 percent) or to 
keep the door open for a white knight (53 percent). Data and 
discussion p. 20. 
• Whether it is proper for a besieged company to give confi-
dential information to a white knight while denying it to 
an unwelcome bidder is still a controversial issue. While 46 
percent give the target company the option to be discrim-
inatory, the remaining 54 percent are split: 30 percent say 
the information should be available to all, and 24 percent say 
the information should remain confidential. Data and discus-
sion p. 22. 
• Whether it is in the best interests of stockholders for a 
company to retain a law firm specializing in tender offers in 
order to prevent the firm from representing the opposition is 
another unresolved issue: 53 percent say retain, 47 percent 
say refrain. Data and discussion p. 23. 
• Banks should not knowingly make loans to finance the 
takeover of one of their own customers if the takeover bid is 
hostile, say 60 percent. But 28 percent say such loans may be 
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proper under certain circumstances—when, for example, the 
bank has only a line relationship with the target company. If 
the takeover bid is friendly, 85 percent agree that such loans 
are proper. Data and discussion p. 24. 
• Eighty-seven percent support the SEC proposal to extend 
the waiting period during which tender offers must remain 
open to thirty days, and many say that thirty days is still not 
time enough. Data and discussion. p. 34. 
• Only 24 percent oppose all government interference in 
merger regulation. The remaining 76 percent, while main-
taining that the market should rule in general, support 
government regulation in certain areas, particularly 
antitrust. Data and discussion p. 32. 
• A clear majority of respondents believe that mergers have 
a beneficial effect on society in the long run, particularly 
through the redeployment of capital to more efficient uses 
(63 percent) and greater efficiency in production (56 percent). 
Data and discussion p. 31. 
METHOD 
These findings reflect the responses of 217 corporate direc-
tors to a questionnaire designed by Prof. James H. Scott Jr., 
Associate Professor of Finance, The Graduate School of 
Business, Columbia University. Professor Scott conducted 
telephone interviews to explore the reasoning behind 
directors' opinions. The respondents are directors of 
companies ranging in sales from $50 million to more than 
$1 billion. The survey data were collected in the fall of 1980. 
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Section 1 
MERGER ACTIVITY 
According to Federal Trade Commission statistics, merger 
activity has maintained a generally high level ever since the 
early 1950s. The assets of "large" manufacturing and mining 
companies acquired, for example, have totaled $1 billion or 
more in each year after 1953, and in some years have 
exceeded $10 billion.* Why has the volume of merger 
activity been so high in recent times? 
A n overwhelming majority of the directors participating 
in the survey (88 percent) believe that one main reason is low 
stock prices (Table 1). The market price of some stocks is 
actually lower today than what the stockholders could 
realize by putting the company out of business, selling its 
assets, and distributing the proceeds. Many companies' 
earnings, moreover, are unusually high in relation to their 
stock prices. Figure 1 shows how reported profits have soared 
above stock prices since 1972. Figure 2 shows that when 
both measures are adjusted for inflation, stock prices have 
actually dropped. 
Because many companies are so undervalued, growth-
minded corporations find it more economical to acquire 
existing companies than to build new facilities and organ-
izations from scratch. "The odds," one director explained, 
"are enormously in favor of buying an old, competent, 
successful, and underpriced company rather than taking 
the risk of building a new plant and wondering if you can 
get environmental approval, meet OSHA requirements, 
and penetrate a competitive market. You can accomplish 
the same growth at less cost and with more chance of 
success through an acquisition. Basically, this is the 
result of undervaluation of stocks. Wall Street is failing 
to value its product fully." 
Another director, however, disputed the majority position. 
"You have to pay too high a premium for acquisitions," he 
said. "For example, I was thinking of putting us in the steel 
distribution business. I found a large Chicago warehouse 
distributor that had a book value of $5 million, and with its 
return on investment, that's just what it was worth. But they 
wanted $12 million. It would've been crazy to pay them a 
*Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. Statistical Report on Mergers 
and Acquisitions 1978 (published in August 1980), Table 14. "Large" companies 
acquired are those with assets of $10 million or more. 
Table 1 
What were the key reasons for the upsurge of mergers in recent years? 
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The low stock market makes it cheaper to 
buy than to build 
The weak U.S. dollar encourages the 
acquisition of U.S. companies by 
foreigners 
Many corporations have excess cash, and 
acquisitions are one way to spend it 
Inflation encourages debt-financed 
acquisitions because the debt can be 
repaid with depreciated dollars 
Acquisitions are easier because the grow-
ing institutional dominance of the stock 
market has weakened stockholder loyalty 
Major 
Reason 
Secondary 
Reason 
No 
Reason 
88% 9% 3% 
62 34 4 
42 48 10 
33 54 13 
18 44 38 
premium of $7 million when I can rent a building and go into 
the business myself with $5 million." 
But this experience does not seem to hold true for other 
industries. One director gave this example: "In the extrac-
tive or natural resource areas, where you need substantial 
capital expenditure, there are literally hundreds of public 
companies in North America for which the replacement costs 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Figure 1. Reported Profits and Stock Prices (1972 = 100) 
While stock prices remained fairly stable from 1972 to 1979, 
reported profits more than doubled. The reported profits 
shown are those of all nonfinancial businesses, and Standard 
& Poor's Composite Index of 500 Stocks is used to represent 
the stock prices of these companies. The data are indexed 
using 1972 as the base year. 
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INFLATION-ADJUSTED PROFITS-$ BILLIONS 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Figure 2. Inflation-Adjusted Profits and Stock Prices in 
Constant Dollars 
When adjusted for inflation, the profits of all nonfinancial 
businesses declined somewhat from 1972 to 1979, while stock 
prices dropped sharply. Profits are adjusted for inflation by 
reducing the reported (historical-cost) amounts by factors 
representing the estimated effect of inflation on inventories, 
property, plant, and equipment. These current-cost amounts 
are then stated in 1979 constant dollars using the GNP 
Implicit Price Deflator. Stock prices are also stated in 1979 
constant dollars. 
REPORTED PROFITS 
STOCK PRICES - S&P 500 
STOCK PRICES IN CONSTANT DOLLARS 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
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would run four, five, or six times the market equity." 
A weak U.S. dollar is another major reason for the high 
rate of mergers in recent years, most directors believe. The 
low value of the dollar relative to other currencies has en-
couraged foreign investors to acquire American companies. 
In their comments, some respondents offered another 
reason: management's drive for self-aggrandizement. The 
larger a company grows, the higher the compensation for 
executives, even if earnings per share remain flat. Also, 
enlarging a company tends to reduce the influence of major 
stockholders. 
B u t if there are so many powerful forces pushing the 
merger rate up, what has kept it from going even higher? 
The main brake on merger activity, directors agree, is the 
difficulty of finding good acquisition candidates (Table 2). In 
one director's definition, good candidates are "companies 
that you could bring in and operate as independent busi-
nesses, reaping the benefits of their growth. There are all 
kinds of dogs available—financially inept companies, sick 
companies, decadent companies, companies that need to 
rebuild completely. Acquirers used to take companies like 
that too, but they've come to regret it. In many cases they're 
the ones that you now see being spun off or liquidated. 
"Nearly every large company I know," he went on, "has 
a full-scale corporate planning department that spends a 
great deal of time trying to find acquisition candidates that 
fit the parent, companies that can be bought at a reasonable 
price and have a price-to-earnings ratio that won't result in 
excessive dilution. They're hard to find." 
No other factor was rated as a major deterrent by a major-
ity of directors. Four additional factors, however, were men-
tioned by respondents. 
• Management's objectives are different from those of the 
stockholders. "The unwillingness of a CEO to lose his own 
empire and become part of another company." 
• While federal antitrust rules are a commonly accepted 
feature of the environment, state takeover laws can present 
difficult obstacles. 
• Excessive prices asked for companies. 
• "The gut feeling that a contested merger is dirty pool." 
Table 2 
To what extent are the following deterrents to mergers? 
Difficulty of finding good acquisition 
candidates 
Unfavorable economic conditions, such as 
high interest rates 
Onerous government regulation, even in 
the case of friendly mergers 
Acquisition candidates rebuff offers that are 
both friendly and generous 
Difficulty of successfully integrating 
potential merger partners 
Effectiveness of lawyers and investment 
bankers in defending against hostile 
takeovers 
Major 
Deterrent 
72% 
39 
32 
27 
25 
21 
Secondary 
Deterrent 
20% 
50 
53 
61 
52 
53 
Little or 
No 
Deterrent 
8% 
11 
15 
12 
23 
26 
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I f it is mainly the limited availability of attractive can-
didates for acquisition that restricts merger activity, just 
what is it that makes a company attractive? The survey 
suggested several characteristics, and directors rated them 
as shown in Table 3. 
One director's comments seem to summarize the results 
shown in the table. "Most of the characteristics you've 
listed," he said, "make a company attractive, but the most 
honest and most testifiable one is a major product line in a 
rapidly growing market. That's what acquirers are looking 
for, and if they find it, they'll make concessions in the other 
areas. I think you can see this now in industries like word 
processing, where the small companies might have some 
very good products, but only the big companies will have the 
power and glory to put the total push behind those products." 
Another director suggested several characteristics that 
should be added to the list. They are: 
• Low capital investment intensity. "You don't have to put 
in a lot of dollars to get only a few dollars in sales." 
• Low labor intensity. "Gives you flexibility." 
• Absence of a major union. "If a plant is locked up by an 
obnoxious union, you're going to have a lot of trouble." 
• Little dependence on government business. "Government 
requirements raise overhead expenses and complicate 
the rest of your business, unless you keep the government 
work in a totally separate accounting activity. Profits on 
government business are disappointing anyway." 
• Low rate of technological change. 
• Little foreign competition. 
One director told how he goes beyond the characteristics of 
the acquisition candidate to assess the effects of the acquisi-
tion on his own company. "The first thing I'd want to know 
is: How would it affect my earnings per share? Next I'd ask 
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Table 3 
Which of the following makes a potential 
extent? 
target company attractive, and to what 
Major product line in a rapidly growing 
market 
Excellent management 
Dominant market position 
Ability to generate significant amounts of 
cash 
Low price-to-earnings ratio 
Possibility of synergistic combination with 
acquirer 
Substantial excess cash or underutilized 
debt capacity 
Poor management 
Major Minor No 
Attraction Attraction Attraction 
91% 8% 1% 
84 14 2 
78 21 1 
66 33 1 
54 38 8 
52 42 6 
43 54 3 
9 22 69 
how my stockholders would react. What would the merger 
do to my price-to-earnings ratio? I'd also want to know how 
it would affect my return on investment, and whether it 
would add to the real sustained growth I've already got 
going." 
Of the characteristics that were on the original list, poor 
management received by far the lowest rating. One reason 
for the undesirability of poor management in a candidate 
for acquisition, as a respondent explains on page 28, is that 
it increases the likelihood of "nasty surprises" after the 
merger. Excellent management, on the other hand, received 
the second-highest rating on the list. Apparently most 
directors would reject the widely held belief that poorly 
managed companies are especially frequent targets of 
takeover attempts. 
Since most directors recognize the success or failure that 
companies experience in acquiring others as at least a 
secondary factor in limiting mergers, the question naturally 
arises: What makes a company a successful acquirer? 
"By all odds," said one director, "the top answer is a 
well-formulated strategic plan accompanied by strong 
management talent. You've got to have both, and then the 
other things will fall in line." Another added: "I must 
emphasize the need for a strategy that includes a careful 
plan of integration. It should specify the degree of autonomy 
that the acquired company will have, spell out reporting 
relationships, and settle other questions on how the two 
organizations will interact." 
It is noteworthy that of the eight characteristics suggested 
by the survey (see Table 4), large size came in last in 
directors' estimation of importance. 
Table 4 
What characteristics are important for a company to be a successful acquirer? 
High Some No 
Importance Importance Importance 
Strong management skills 94% 6% 0% 
A well-formulated strategic plan 86 14 0 
Excess cash or underutilized debt capacity 52 40 8 
Potential synergy with the target company 51 39 10 
Intimate knowledge of the target company's 
business 48 41 11 
Above-average profitability 46 47 7 
Above-average price-to-earnings ratio 41 52 7 
Large size 6 61 33 
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After subsiding somewhat in the mid-1970s, merger 
activity returned to high levels in the latter years of the 
decade. As Figure 3 shows, however, a substantial decline 
occurred in the second quarter of 1980, and many economists 
and businessmen have wondered if this downward trend will 
continue. 
Seventy percent of the respondents think it will (Table 5). 
Of these, many foresee an even steeper decline ahead, owing 
mainly to stricter government regulation and high interest 
rates. In their remarks, some directors also predicted 
that the dwindling number of attractive candidates for 
acquisition and a rise in the stock market may contribute 
to a decrease in mergers. 
"Every board that I'm on," said one director, "has a policy 
in favor of acquiring other companies. Many boards are very 
fussy about the type of company they want to acquire, the 
terms of acquisition, and the degree of fit, but they all 
would like to acquire somebody. So merger activity is 
going to continue, but at a decreasing rate, I think. We're 
not building as many new companies as we should in this 
country, and those new companies are the great opportun-
ities for acquisition." 
Merger activity "will always be a significant factor," 
another director agreed. "It's part of the process of ration-
alization. But it's cyclical. There are peaks and valleys." 
Directors who predict an increase in merger activity say it 
will come as a result of lower interest rates and the drive of 
companies to grow. Also, continuing high inflation will keep 
the cost of building a new operation above that of buying 
an existing company and will weaken some companies 
financially, leaving them vulnerable to takeover. Foreign 
investment, moreover, will continue at a high rate. And 
finally, the tax laws make financial restructuring more 
rewarding than productive investment. 
"I'm positive," one director said, "that merger activity 
has declined only because of high interest rates and the 
government restraints on nonproductive loans. Basically, 
the economics of acquisitions remain superb. So when 
those restraints are lifted and interest rates become a little 
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Table 5 
Do you think merger activity will continue to decline at the present rate, decline 
faster, or begin to increase? 
Continue to decline 41 % 
Decline faster because of 
harsher government regulation 17% 
Decline faster because of 
unfavorable economic con-
ditions, such as high interest rates 17% 
Increase 30% 
NOTE: Percentages add up to more than 100 because some 
participants checked more than one response. 
more reasonable—and particularly if the SEC succeeds 
in preempting the state merger laws—we're going to see an 
absolute turkey shoot." 
These dissenting opinions notwithstanding, it is striking 
that such a substantial majority of respondents—70 per-
cent—predict a decrease in merger activity in the coming 
years. Since most of the respondents are directors of at 
least three companies, this prediction may prove to be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Figure 3. Quarterly Merger Activity, 1975-1980 
The data shown are for mergers completed for value in excess 
of $700,000. Source: Mergers & Acquisitions, The Journal of 
Corporate Venture, various issues. 
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Section 2 
THE MERGER DECISION 
When a company becomes the object of a merger proposal, 
it must decide whether to accept the offer or to oppose it. 
The interests of many parties stand to be affected by this 
decision—not only the company's stockholders and employ-
ees, but its customers, its suppliers, and the community in 
which it is located. The effect on one group of stockholders, 
moreover, might differ from that on another; and the effect 
on top management might differ from that on other 
employees. 
Some of these parties are in a position to influence the 
decision and others are not. The survey asked directors who, 
in their experience, actually does have a say It also asked for 
their opinion on who should have a say. 
Ninety-two percent of the respondents report that the 
chief executive officer does in fact have a significant influ-
ence on the decision (Table 6). There is little doubt that 
he should have at least some say in the matter (only one 
respondent said the CEO should have no influence at all). 
But when asked how much influence the CEO should have, 
a substantial minority (29 percent) say only some. Inter-
esting to note is that 31 percent of the respondents have 
participated in five or more mergers during their experience 
as directors. Nearly half of this group (46 percent) say the 
CEO should be limited to only some influence on the decision 
(statistics derived from the demographics and further 
tabulation of the raw data). 
Even more interesting, perhaps, is the response of another 
group—directors who are CEOs themselves (34 percent). 
Like the other respondents, 90 percent of this group recog-
nize that the CEO does have a significant influence on the 
decision. But 70 percent believe that he should have this 
much influence. In other words, 20 percent of the CEOs think 
that the CEO has more influence than he ought to have. 
One director explained that the inside directors and the 
CEO usually set the stage for the decision. Their opinion 
carries the most weight, he said, because they are the best 
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Table 6 
When a target company has decided to accept or oppose a merger proposal, to 
what degree have the following influenced the final decision? To what degree 
should they influence the decision? 
Significant Influence Some Influence No Influence 
Does 
Have 
Should 
Have 
Does 
Have 
Should 
Have 
Does 
Have 
Should 
Have 
Chief executive officer 92% 71% 8% 29% 0% 0% 
Outside directors 54 79 44 20 2 1 
Dominant stockholder 54 57 33 39 13 4 
Inside directors 42 44 52 45 6 11 
Other 22 40 39 30 39 30 
informed. "But these insiders have more than just an inves-
tor's interest in the issue. Their careers and ego commit-
ments may also be at stake. To avoid being placed in a posi-
tion where they must report to someone else in the acquir-
ing company's hierarchy, they may push for a decision to 
oppose the merger even though the offer would give stock-
holders good value for their shares. Or this motivation might 
also work the other way, as in the case of a retirement-age 
CEO who favors a merger because he would rather be the 
last king than provide a successor to manage the inde-
pendent company." 
Since the interests of stockholders as a whole could suffer 
in such situations, many respondents think that outside 
directors should have more influence on the decision than 
they usually do. Whereas 54 percent of the respondents say 
that outside directors already influence the decision signifi-
cantly, 79 percent say they should. Once again, the spread 
was even wider among those who have participated in five 
or more mergers during their experience as a director. Of 
this group, 51 percent report that outside directors do have 
significant influence and 91 percent believe they should. 
Given that the CEO and the inside directors will inevita-
bly have a powerful influence on the merger decision, what 
measures could better insure that they will throw their 
weight behind the interests of the stockholders? One director 
suggested that if the top officers have a reasonable amount 
of stock under option, their interests will more nearly coin-
cide with those of the stockholders. Another said: "If I had 
my way, any company that I was associated with would pro-
tect the top three or four officers of the company, whether 
directors or not, with a personal services contract assuring 
them of very generous compensation in case they were 
thrown out as a result of an acquisition." Protected by such a 
contract, officers of a company whose board decided to oppose 
a merger could "fight to the death," knowing that if they 
lost both the takeover battle and their jobs, they could still 
meet their family responsibilities for two or three years. 
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O f course, the parties that influence the merger decision 
can, and normally do, consider interests other than their own 
private advantage. The survey asked directors what 
interests usually are considered in making this decision, and 
what interests ought to be considered. Once again, many 
respondents think that stockholder interests are given less 
consideration than they ought to be given, while top-
management interests receive more consideration than they 
should (Table 7). 
As for other parties who are likely to be affected by the 
merger decision, particularly employees, customers, and the 
community, a consistent minority seemed to side with the 
director who said: "I don't think it should be strictly the 
interests of the stockholders alone. It has to be a balance of 
interests, with weight given to large stockholders and small, 
to employees, customers, suppliers, and all the other parties 
that have a stake in the company. Different weights should 
be given to each interest, but no standard formula exists to 
tell you how much weight each one should have. It depends 
on the type of company, its financial position, and its stage 
in the life cycle." Other respondents dissent from this view. 
In their opinion, the stockholders' interests should be 
given major consideration. One director argued that the 
risk-to-reward ratio on equity investment is already un-
favorable and would become even more so if other interests 
prevailed over those of the stockholders on basic issues such 
as a merger decision. This, he said, would further deter 
saving, capital formation, and investment. 
"Efficiency and humanity don't always go together," 
another director admitted. "But mergers can be a mechan-
ism for the market to extort efficiency out of capital, and 
there's a good case to be made for efficiency. It creates and 
protects jobs. If you're not efficient, foreign investors will 
take you over." 
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Table 7 
When final decisions have been made to accept or oppose a merger proposal, 
to what degree have the interests of the following been considered? Whose 
interests should be given the most weight? 
Consideration Consideration 
Actually Given Should be Given 
Significant Some None Significant Some None 
All stockholders as a group 78% 20% 2% 95% 5% 0% 
Top management 58 40 2 33 61 6 
Long-term stockholders 42 43 15 47 40 13 
Directors 30 41 29 22 35 43 
Other employees 28 63 9 31 66 3 
Customers 20 58 22 24 62 14 
Community 14 58 28 22 65 13 
Suppliers 8 48 44 7 50 43 
Arbitrageurs 4 11 85 0 6 94 
Although a notable minority of the respondents maintain 
that the interests of parties other than stockholders should 
be given significant consideration (see Table 7), directors are 
almost unanimous in rejecting the suggestion that these 
interests should have separate representation on corporate 
boards (Table 8). Apparently the calls often made for board 
representation for employees, minorities, and community 
interests have failed to persuade many corporate directors. 
One respondent argued that separate representation 
should be unnecessary. "The outside directors," he said, 
"should be well enough aware of their duties as board 
members, and experienced enough as business people, to 
represent nonstockholder interests effectively. A competent 
outside director can stand very solidly for the interests of 
minorities, customers, suppliers, the community, and so on." 
Another director was more succinct. Separate represen-
tation for nonstockholders, he remarked, is "hogwash 
dreamed up by inside directors to serve their own interest." 
Table 8 
Because of their possible effects on mergers, should interests other than 
stockholders have separate representation on corporate boards? 
No, only stockholders should be represented 89% 
Yes, other interests should be represented 11 % 
These interests should include: 
Community 65% 
Employees other than top management 53% 
Minority groups 26% 
Customers 17% 
Suppliers 13% 
Other 22% 
NOTE: Many respondents checked more than one nonstockholder 
interest. 
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What is the best reason for fighting a takeover bid? To 
refuse an offer that is too low, directors answer. "When the 
price, whether in terms of present money, future money, or 
stock in the acquiring corporation, does not represent fair 
value for the stockholders, then and only then should a vig-
orous defense be mounted," one director said. This seems to 
sum up the preponderance of opinion measured by the survey 
(Table 9). 
Consistently enough, directors go on to identify the worst 
reason for resisting acquisition as that of protecting top 
management. Seventy-seven percent of them categorize this 
as a weak justification. 
Independence for independence's sake receives only 
lukewarm support. It is described as an excellent reason for 
resisting acquisition by 28 percent of the respondents. Some 
directors believe that independence can, under certain cir-
cumstances, be justified against a takeover bid that seems 
attractive on a short-term basis. When a company's prospects 
for future growth are bright, a price that looks handsome 
today might be considered inadequate after a few years, 
particularly if the acquirer intends to take the company in 
a direction that will not lead toward its best opportunities. 
On this line of thought, however, the ultimate value is not 
Table 9 
In the face of an unwelcome tender offer, how do you rate the following reasons 
for mounting a vigorous defense? 
To elicit a higher bid price from the acquirer 
To preserve the possibility of a subsequent 
negotiated transaction with a bidder of 
the company's choice 
To protect the company's independence 
To protect the corporate organization from 
possible disruptive changes 
To preserve a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the company and 
the community 
To protect top management 
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Excellent Good Weak 
54% 26% 20% 
53 39 8 
28 29 43 
27 40 33 
21 50 29 
6 17 77 
independence itself but the interests of the stockholders— 
their long-term interests. And this value can just as well 
serve as a reason to accept a merger offer. "The real justi-
fication for mergers, other than saving financially distressed 
companies," said one director, "is to bring in small, struggling 
companies which, on their own financial resources, would 
take perhaps twenty years to reach their full potential, but 
can do it in five if they come into your larger, well-
financed company." 
Yet directors do not entirely reject reasons that are only 
tangential to the interests of the stockholders. Although the 
preservation of a mutually beneficial relationship between a 
company and the community is rated as an excellent reason 
for opposing a takeover bid by only 21 percent, it is accepted 
as a good reason by 50 percent. Those rating it as excellent 
appear to be roughly the same minority that think com-
munity interests should be given significant consideration 
in the merger decision (22 percent: see Table 7)—in general, 
those directors who favor a balancing of interests, not an 
exclusive consideration of stockholder interests alone. "The 
only illegitimate reason for opposing a takeover bid," said one 
of this persuasion, "is to place the interests of those making 
the decisions over the interests of the other people who 
should be considered." 
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Section 3 
WAYS AND MEANS 
To a certain extent, the tactics that a besieged company may 
use in fighting a takeover bid are governed by state and 
federal law, but in many circumstances the law leaves the 
use of a particular tactic up to the company's discretion. 
For example, when a company decides to resist a takeover 
bid from one would-be acquirer, the best defense may be 
to merge with another, more desirable acquirer—a white 
knight. TO give the white knight an advantage in the contest, 
the besieged company may consider making it privy to 
confidential information that is withheld from the unwel-
come bidder. 
T h e survey asked directors whether they thought it proper 
to give confidential information to a white knight while 
withholding the same information from another bidder. 
Forty-six percent say yes (Table 10). "White knights will 
enter the contest only if they get help from the besieged," one 
director explained, "and without white knights there's no 
auction." 
Presumably, stockholders would benefit from an auction 
that bids prices up, but some directors doubt that the 
encouragement of white knights is always motivated by 
concern for stockholder interests. "White knights," one 
respondent said, "are generally guys who assure top 
management of better jobs. Often they're management-
dominated companies with no significant stockholder." 
Another respondent stipulated that a white knight should 
get privileged access to confidential information only if the 
decision is made by the besieged company's stockholders. 
Strictly on the issue of propriety, some respondents believe 
that management and the board of directors have the right 
and indeed the duty to employ this tactic if, in their judg-
ment, the company's future should lie with the white knight; 
while a narrow majority (54 percent) believe that no 
confidential information should be given to any bidder or 
that the same information should be given to all bidders. But 
respondents of this persuasion say they are under no illusion 
that such fairness actually prevails. "The way it should be," 
one said, "is that both sides should have equal information. 
The way it is, of course, is that the white knight gets the 
inside data." 
22 
Table 10 
Suppose a company is resisting a takeover attempt, and suppose a more 
desirable company (a "white knight") enters the bidding contest. Is it proper 
for the target company to give confidential information to the white knight 
while denying it to the first bidder? 
Yes, the target may give the information 
to the bidder it finds most attractive 46% 
No, the information should be available to all 30% 
No, the information should remain confidential 24% 
Another tactic used by some companies that feel vulner-
able to takeover attempts is a kind of preventive mea-
sure, adopted before any tender offer has been announced. 
The company keeps a law firm specializing in tender 
offers on retainer, both to prevent a would-be acquirer from 
engaging the same firm and to have expert legal help on 
hand in case of a sudden takeover bid. The survey asked 
directors whether they thought this tactic, which involves 
the regular payment of retainer fees to a law firm, is usually 
in the best interests of the stockholders. Fifty-three percent 
agree that it is (Table 11). 
One director explained: "Even when management hires 
the best gunslingers it can get just to protect its own stock 
options and jobs, the stockholders usually get a much higher 
price in a tender offer because, with the law firm's help, the 
company can fight the takeover long and hard." 
Directors who disagree point out that whereas at one time 
expertise in tender offers was concentrated in only a few law 
firms, there are now many large, reputable firms with 
specialists in this area. Also, the current SEC-mandated 
twenty-day waiting period has ended the era of the "Satur-
day night special," when "you didn't even know you were the 
object of a hostile tender offer until you read it in the Monday 
Wall Street Journal, and you had no time at all in which to 
work. If you had to go looking for a law firm at that point, and 
found most firms giving top priority to companies that had 
them on retainer, it could be tough." 
Table 11 
A potential target company can prevent a law firm from opposing it in a hostile 
tender offer by hiring the firm on a retainer basis. In the majority of cases, is the 
payment of these contingency fees in the stockholder's best interests? 
Yes 53% 
Yes, because the assurance of 
the best available legal talent is likely 
to be in the stockholder's best interests 48% 
Yes, because a vigorous 
defense will result in higher 
prices for the stockholder's shares 15% 
Yes, for other reasons 0% 
No 47% 
No, because specialized legal 
talents today are available 
from many firms and such 
investments are therefore unnecessary 35% 
No, because such contingency fees 
are usually paid to protect man-
agement at the expense of stockholders 15% 
No, for other reasons 1 % 
NOTE: Many respondents checked more than one reason for yes or no. 
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Some besieged companies have also been astonished to 
learn that the attempt to take them over was being fi-
nanced by their own bank. A clear majority of the respon-
dents—60 percent—think banks should not knowingly make 
loans to finance the hostile takeover of one of their own 
customers (Table 12). "Immoral," one director called it. 
Although banks place a so-called "Chinese Wall" between 
lending officers and trust officers, and between two lending 
officers serving two such customers, some danger remains 
that the wall may be breached. And even if it holds firm, "a 
bank must not only do what is right, but appear to be doing 
right. The banking system cannot sustain itself on perceived 
improprieties. It doesn't matter what the truth of the matter 
is. If it looks bad, it is bad for the banking system." 
Although only 12 percent of the respondents say there is 
nothing at all wrong with such loans, 28 percent say they 
may be proper under certain circumstances. Some directors 
feel that when a bank has only a line relationship with the 
target company, it may loan money to take the company over. 
"I think it's too restrictive," said one director, "to insist that a 
bank is immediately excluded from financing the takeover of 
anyone it has any kind of relationship with." But a director of 
the "under no circumstances" camp countered by arguing 
that line banks receive the same information about a 
customer as the lead bank does, since they make the same 
kind of credit analysis. Thus, the distinction between line 
and lead banks is irrelevant to this issue. 
In addition to the type of relationship that a bank has with 
a customer, the bank might properly consider the amount of 
credit it provides, another respondent suggested. "If a bank 
has $100 million out on one customer, and that company 
wants to acquire another customer, of whom the bank, as one 
of fourteen in the line, has a $100,000 piece, then I think the 
bank has to say to the smaller customer: sorry about that. 
The ratio is 100 million to 100 thousand. What if it's only 50 
million to 500 thousand? Well, at some point the ratio gets 
too narrow and you have a real conflict of interest. But there 
is a common-sense area in which you should go along and 
make the loan for a hostile tender offer." 
Table 12 
Recently some banks have helped to finance the takeover of one of their 
customers by another. Should a bank make such loans in the case of a hostile 
takeover bid? In the case of a friendly takeover bid? 
Hostile 
Such loans should take place 12% 
Such loans are inappropriate 60% 
Such loans are appropriate only in 
special cases—when, for example, 
the bank is one of several line 
banks and has no lead rela-
tionship to the target company 28% 
Friendly 
Such loans should take place 85% 
Such loans are inappropriate 5% 
Such loans are appro-
priate only in special cases 10% 
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A friendly tender offer is a different matter altogether, 
directors agree. Eighty-five percent say it is proper for a 
bank to loan money to one customer for the purpose of taking 
over another customer in a friendly merger. Conflict of 
interest does not apply in this case, they observe. "If it's a 
friendly deal, the people who are acquiring will have as 
much information as the bank." 
But is it really a friendly deal? Are the stockholders in 
favor of the merger, or only the management? These 
questions give rise to reservations in some directors' minds. 
"It's not always easy to draw the line between friendly and 
hostile," one observed. "This puts the bank in the position of 
having to decide how friendly a tender offer is," said another. 
T h e survey also elicited directors' opinions on the role 
of investment bankers in acquisitions. If an investment 
banker's client becomes the object of a hostile takeover 
attempt, is it ever proper for the investment banker to aid 
the would-be acquirer? 
No, never, say 76 percent of the respondents (Table 13). 
"It's worse than wrong," one director emphasized. "It's dis-
graceful." Referring to a recent highly publicized case of 
this nature, in which a court found the investment banker 
not liable for damages, another director said: "Yes, I read all 
the verbiage, all the cosmetics, all the nice terms. But none of 
it changes the fact that the investment banker profited 
mightily by abusing the trust given it." Still another, while 
admitting that the case may have looked worse than it really 
was, said, "I don't care about the reality and the appearance. 
Investment bankers just have to be cleaner than that. It's 
one of the penalties of being in their business." 
Directors who believe that an investment banker may, 
under some circumstances, aid a would-be acquirer in a 
hostile takeover of a client often stipulate that the invest-
ment banker should not divulge inside information if the 
client released the information with the clear expectation 
that it be kept confidential. 
Table 13 
Suppose an investment banker has confidential information about a client, 
and the client becomes the target of a hostile takeover attempt. Under what 
circumstances is it proper for the investment banker to aid the would-be 
acquirer in the takeover attempt? 
An investment banker should never aid a 
hostile takeover of one of its clients 76% 
An investment banker can aid the 
would-be acquirer as long as it 
does not disclose the confidential 
information it has about the target company 19% 
The investment banker can aid the 
would-be acquirer only because the target 
company is trying to obtain a higher price 3% 
Other 2% 
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When a company finds itself the object of a tender offer, the 
board of directors often commissions the company's invest-
ment banker to evaluate its stock. This evaluation provides 
some bench mark with which to compare the price being 
offered by the would-be acquirer. Are such evaluations 
reasonably accurate? 
Some 4 percent of the respondents answer yes, "virtually 
always" (Table 14). Forty-seven percent say that these 
evaluations are "usually" accurate, and 36 percent rate them 
as "sometimes" accurate. Thirteen percent answer "seldom." 
"I would guess it's somewhere around the middle," said 
one director, "mainly because of the difficulty of valuing a 
business. The investment banker, because of his entree into 
the company, might have a better chance of coming close 
than a financial analyst would." 
Another director explained: "Appraisals of this sort are 
inherently very difficult. You shouldn't expect to get a cor-
rect answer. But in the final analysis, you have to have an 
appraisal. Even a bad one is better than none. So you get the 
best you can, be skeptical as hell about it, and follow your 
instincts." 
Table 14 
In defending against a hostile tender offer, corporate boards often ask their 
investment bankers to advise them of the adequacy of the price bid by the 
would-be acquirer. In your experience, do the opinions that result from this 
procedure correctly gauge the appropriate value of the company and the 
premium that can be expected by stockholders to maximize their opportunity? 
Virtually always 4% 
Usually 47% 
Sometimes 36% 
Seldom 13% 
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Section 4 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
"Acquisitions," one director wrote, "produce growth. Growth 
is a factor in basic reputation. Reputation develops morale, 
energy, acceptance. Acquisition is almost spiritual in its 
effects on the acquirer." 
There are also several benefits of a more physical nature 
that one company may realistically expect to gain by 
acquiring another, directors say. Fifteen specific benefits 
suggested by the survey are rated by the respondents in the 
order shown in Table 15. Perhaps the most interesting thing 
about these data is that "little or no benefit" received so few 
votes. Table 15 can be read as a massive confirmation of most 
of the benefits ever hoped for in making a tender offer. 
Against this background of general confirmation, the 
possible advantages that fell to the bottom of the list deserve 
particular attention. The utilization of excess cash, whether 
it belongs to the acquiring company or the acquired, is rated 
as a major benefit by less than 30 percent of the respondents. 
Also, taking over another company just to get bigger is 
seen as providing little or no benefit by 63 percent of the 
respondents. In their remarks, some directors expressed 
skepticism that stockholders benefit from acquisitions made 
primarily to inflate management egos. Yet they do recognize 
special situations in which bigger may be better. One gave 
this example: "Occasionally mergers take place involving, 
let's say, six regional producers. As a national organization, 
they enjoy the advantages of a national marketing program, 
national TV scheduling, and certain economies of scale— 
things they could never have done as regional companies." 
While confirming so many of the benefits suggested by 
the survey, directors often caution that the achievement 
of any real benefits in a merger depends on the particular 
circumstances. "There are many variables affecting the 
realization of expected benefits," said one director, "but two 
things are especially important. First, how well does the 
acquiring company know the industry of the acquired? If 
not very well, it could be disappointed. And second, what 
attitude does the acquiring company take toward integrat-
ing the incoming people, resources, and facilities with its 
own? Only too rarely is the process of integration given any 
thought before the merger takes place." 
Table 15 
What are the major benefits that a company can realistically expect to gain by 
acquisition? 
Little 
Major Secondary or No 
Benefit Benefit Benefit 
Diversifying into a new area, but one related 
to the acquiring company's expertise 68% 29% 3% 
Increasing profits by a synergistic combination 
of marketing and distribution facilities 67 29 4 
Acquiring a new product to round out the 
acquiring company's product line 64 35 1 
Increasing profits by a synergistic combination 
of production facilities 60 32 8 
Increasing the earnings per share of the 
acquiring company 51 39 10 
Increasing profits by a synergistic combination 
of management expertise 49 40 11 
Increasing market share 46 36 18 
Increasing profits by installing new manage-
ment techniques in the target company 42 41 17 
Diversifying into a completely new area 42 32 26 
Acquiring a company whose management has 
not provided the leadership to maximize 
return on investment 41 48 11 
Obtaining a reliable source of raw material 39 46 15 
Enjoying the financial benefits of acquiring an 
underpriced company 38 44 18 
Using the excess cash and underutilized 
borrowing capacity of the acquiring 
company 29 53 18 
Using the excess cash of the target company 22 59 19 
Increasing the size of the acquiring 
organization 6 31 63 
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After a merger, what problems are most likely to prevent 
the expected benefits from being achieved? Directors give 
first place to the difficulty of integrating two different 
organizations, followed closely by the voluntary departure 
of key managers of the acquired company (Table 16). "As a 
CEO," one director explained, "you've been used to running 
your own show, and now all of a sudden you're just a division 
president. Now, instead of reporting to a board of directors, 
you're reporting to a CEO who is probably your own age plus 
or minus five years. That presents a problem." In addition, 
it is very difficult, as another director said, "to change the 
customs of a company. You have to change their accounting 
and control procedures, their policy manuals, their pension 
plan, their vacation policy. You have to accommodate two 
different managerial styles. A few corporations have been 
able to cope with this, but more often the dominant company 
makes a fetish of forcing the incoming group into its own 
pattern." 
Most directors also recognize that major or secondary 
problems can arise either from unrealistic initial plans for 
the merger or from unpleasant surprises, such as the dis-
covery of a legal liability. "A hostile takeover can be very 
foolish," one director pointed out, "when you don't know the 
quality of the inventories or receivables you've acquired, or 
the nature of the credit lines. So nowadays, companies are 
looking for good management in the companies they're 
considering for acquisition, on the theory that good manage-
ment is their best guarantee against nasty surprises." 
Again, many respondents want it understood that the ob-
stacles, if any, to the achievement of benefits from a merger 
depend on the particular circumstances. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that a large majority 
of respondents see at least a secondary problem lurking in all 
of the possible trouble areas suggested by the survey. "I agree 
with Murphy's Law," one director said: "Anything that can 
go wrong will go wrong—and at the worst possible time. 
It is hard to integrate two organizations. People do get dis-
enchanted. Companies don't have the right expectations. 
And there's maybe a 60 or 70 percent chance that some very 
unpleasant surprises will turn up. People don't tell you 
everything." 
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Table 16 
After a merger has taken place, which of the following are likely to create 
problems, and to what extent? 
Major Secondary No 
Problem Problem Problem 
Difficulty of effectively integrating two 
different organizations 61% 38% 1% 
Voluntary departure of key managers of the 
acquired company 55 41 4 
Unrealistic initial plans—for example, sales 
grow more slowly than anticipated 35 56 9 
Unpleasant surprises—for example, the 
discovery of a major legal liability 29 50 21 
I n rating the possible benefits of mergers and judging 
the problems that may prevent these benefits from being 
achieved (Tables 15 and 16), respondents were allowed to 
assume that they were speaking of friendly mergers. In the 
next question, they were asked to concentrate on hostile 
takeovers only. 
Since a director's primary responsibility is to the stock-
holders, the respondents' rating of the effects of a hostile 
but successful takeover bid on stockholder interests is 
particularly important. The impression given by the data 
shown in Table 17 is that directors are somewhat guarded 
about the benefit that such mergers provide for stockholders. 
Moreover, many directors feel that this benefit, if any, may 
be mixed with harm. 
Directors are more positive about the benefit that hostile 
mergers provide for top management of the acquiring 
company, but for the top management of the acquired com-
pany a clear majority see at least some harm. As Table 17 
shows, the top managers of a poorly managed company that 
is taken over are likely to suffer more harm, in respondents' 
opinion, than the top managers of a well-managed company; 
but even the latter are believed to have little to gain and 
much to lose. 
Other parties affected by a hostile takeover are also 
believed to fare badly. Both the community in which the 
acquired company is located and the company's employees 
other than top management suffer some harm and gain no 
benefit, say a majority of respondents. Only the customers 
and suppliers of the acquired company are believed to escape 
real harm as a result of the merger. 
In their comments, several directors explained the cir-
cumstances in which hostile takeovers could produce gains 
or losses for stockholders. For their shares in the acquired 
company, stockholders usually receive a premium over the 
stock's market price. Thus, even after paying the capital 
gains tax, they may net a profit which they can reinvest as 
they see fit. But this premium price may still be lower than 
the company's liquidation value. Because stockholders are 
seldom given the choice of liquidation, they may accept the 
tender offer "knowing that the inherent value of their shares 
Table 17 
To what extent do the following benefit by successful hostile tender offers, and to 
what extent are they adversely affected? 
Benefit 
Signifi-
cant Some No 
Harm 
Signifi-
cant Some No 
Benefit Benefit Benefit Harm Harm Harm 
Stockholders of acquiring 
company 13% 71% 16% 2% 43% 55% 
Stockholders of target 
company 35 53 12 8 35 57 
Top management of acquiring 
company 43 47 10 3 21 76 
Top management of a well-
managed target company 15 43 42 25 50 25 
Top management of a poorly 
managed target company 4 17 79 80 12 8 
Other employees of acquiring 
company — — — 1 26 73 
Other employees of target 
company 3 36 61 8 59 33 
Outside directors of acquiring 
company 6 45 49 — — — 
Outside directors of target 
company 0 14 86 43 37 20 
Community in which target 
company is located 3 32 65 13 52 35 
Customers of target company — — — 2 31 67 
Suppliers of target company — — — 2 44 54 
NOTE: Dashes indicate that for this party the question was not asked. 
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is much higher. So they simply take their cash," one director 
charged, "and leave the market. And then we wonder why!" 
Another director observed that in the long run, "You never 
know how much an investment would have grown if left in 
the company, as compared with the growth achieved by 
accepting the tender offer, paying the capital gains tax, and 
investing the money elsewhere." 
The long-run benefits to the stockholders of the acquiring 
company, meanwhile, depend on "how well the marriage 
works out. If the acquiring company has a good strategic 
plan, if the acquired company fits into it, and if management 
recognizes the people factor in the merger, then the stock-
holders and everyone else concerned can benefit. But if the 
integration process doesn't work and the incoming people 
are mismanaged, then the stockholders are hurt and so is 
everyone else. Unfortunately, a lot of acquired companies 
have been very badly managed by the acquiring company." 
H o w do the parties involved fare when a hostile takeover 
bid fails? Obviously, the effects are less serious than when 
the attempt succeeds, directors say. For top management 
of the target company, "it's like getting mugged and losing 
only fifty dollars and your credit cards. The cash loss doesn't 
break you, and reporting the loss of your cards doesn't take a 
lot of time. But it's still a disagreeable experience." 
On this analogy, however, the mugger enjoys some small 
gain, whereas in a hostile takeover bid that ultimately fails, 
directors believe that everyone loses. As Table 18 shows, a 
majority of the respondents say that even the stockholders of 
the bidding company suffer at least some harm. And the top 
management of the would-be acquirer is most likely to be hurt 
—74 percent of the respondents say this party suffers at least 
some harm. 
Directors observed that a company's image is tarnished 
when it fails in a takeover attempt. In addition, both com-
panies spend a great deal of money in the battle—money that 
might otherwise have benefited the stockholders through 
dividends or capital improvements. The battle also consumes 
a great deal of top management's time, possibly causing 
both companies to suffer from lack of careful, attentive 
management. 
Table 18 
To what extent are the following harmed by unsuccessful hostile tender offers? 
Signifi-
cant Some No 
Harm Harm Harm 
Stockholders of bidding company 4% 49% 47% 
Stockholders of target company 13 46 41 
Top management of bidding company 12 62 26 
Top management of target company 11 47 42 
Other employees of bidding company 0 18 82 
Other employees of target company 3 30 67 
Outside directors of bidding company 6 39 55 
Outside directors of target company 5 29 66 
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Next, directors were asked for their views on a much 
broader topic: What long-range effects do mergers in gen-
eral have on society? Six effects often suggested by econo-
mists were rated by the respondents as shown in Table 19. 
One point brought out by these data is that directors 
clearly tend to believe that mergers result in a net benefit to 
customers. While nine out of ten directors agree that 
products are produced more efficiently through mergers and 
priced to give customers greater value, only half say that 
customers suffer because of greater monopoly power brought 
about through mergers. 
It is also clear, though not by such a wide margin, that 
directors tend to approve of the effect of mergers on the 
merging companies themselves. Only 13 percent deny that 
mergers have any disciplinary effect on top management 
at all, and 39 percent say that this effect is significant. 
But the alleged depersonalization caused by mergers is 
called significant by only 20 percent, and 38 percent call 
it unimportant. 
Directors who volunteered comments went beyond the six 
effects suggested by the survey, pointing out that the effects 
depend on whether it is a good merger or a bad merger. Good 
mergers often save companies that are in danger of failing, 
they say. Such mergers "really save jobs, and save business 
for suppliers, distributors, and dealers." 
Bad mergers "over-reward some people for acquiring the 
works of others, cutting the others off from the long-term 
benefits of their own works. This is damaging to the country 
and indeed to the free enterprise system throughout the 
world, for this system thrives only when the greatest 
rewards go to the entrepreneur and the independent 
developer." 
Another director speculated that merger activity, if 
unchecked by market forces or government restrictions, 
might eventually result in the ownership of the bulk of 
American business by a few super-giant corporations. Inev-
itably, these corporations would be subject to increasingly 
powerful government control, and finally business would 
discover that it had merged itself into socialism. 
Table 19 
The following are cited as possible long-range effects of mergers on society. 
To what degree are they important? 
Significant Secondary No 
Importance Importance Importance 
Capital is redeployed to a more efficient use 63% 27% 10% 
Products are produced more efficiently and 
priced to give customers greater value 56 33 11 
The existence of an active acquisitions 
mechanism serves as an effective 
discipline for the top management of 
publicly traded companies 39 48 13 
Social interactions become increasingly 
depersonalized because mergers foster 
ever-larger corporations 20 42 38 
Customers suffer because, despite 
government regulation, mergers result in 
greater monopoly power 13 38 49 
Investors suffer because mergers increase 
the complexity of companies, thus 
making them more difficult to analyze and 
evaluate 6 45 49 
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Section 5 
REGULATING MERGERS 
Government definitely has a role in regulating mergers, say 
the directors who participated in the survey. Seventy-six 
percent support government regulation in one form or 
another, and of these, 95 percent see a need for antitrust 
regulation to protect competition. The administration of 
antitrust laws, however, came in for criticism. "One often 
wonders," said one respondent, "if the purposes of the 
legislation are really being served by all the paperwork 
that's required." 
Other forms of regulation received less support (Table 20). 
Forty-five percent of the directors supporting any regulation 
specifically endorse federal takeover laws, and 34 percent 
endorse state takeover laws. It should be noted, however, 
that 34 percent of the directors taking part in the survey are 
also CEOs (see Table 28), and of this group only 12 percent 
support state or federal takeover laws. Also, the respondents 
have had more experience as acquirers than as objects of 
tender offers (see Tables 26 and 27). A group of directors who 
have been more often on the receiving end might express 
more support for takeover laws. 
Prohibition of some takeover tactics that are now permitted 
received the support of 18 percent of the directors favoring 
regulation. "The purpose of the antitrust law is the protec-
tion of a free market," one of this minority stated. "Certain 
takeover tactics have the opposite effect." 
Legislation limiting or prohibiting foreign takeovers is 
supported by 15 percent of the directors favoring regulation. 
"The takeover of U.S. banks by foreign banks, many of which 
are partially government owned, should be prohibited," said 
one director. "I don't think a foreign company should buy a 
U.S. company that does important defense work," said 
another. 
Prohibition of large mergers received the support of only 
12 percent of the directors favoring regulation. One respon-
dent, however, suggested the possibility that certain types of 
large acquisitions might be made subject to a longer waiting 
period and jurisdictional review. 
Prohibition of hostile takeovers, with only 8 percent, 
received the least support from directors favoring regulation. 
One director expressing the majority opinion said: "Specific 
prohibitions, whether of hostile takeovers, large mergers, 
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Table 20 
What is the appropriate role of government in merger regulation? 
The market, 
not the government, should rule 24% 
The market should rule, except for govern-
mental regulation in the following areas: 76% 
Antitrust regulation 95% 
Federal takeover statutes 45% 
State takeover statutes 34% 
Prohibitions against some takeover 
tactics that are currently permissible 18% 
Prohibitions against foreign takeovers 15% 
Prohibitions against large mergers 12% 
Prohibitions against hostile takeovers 8% 
Other 4% 
All mergers should be prohibited 0% 
NOTE: Many respondents checked more than one form of regulation. 
foreign takeovers, or whatever, are political issues. Purely 
from the standpoint of benefiting investors, the government 
only has to insure full disclosure. And full disclosure, of 
course, involves the antitrust law." 
Should regulation have the general effect of making 
mergers any easier or more difficult than they are now? No, 
answer 54 percent of the respondents (Table 21). Thirty-five 
percent say yes, the general effect of regulation should be 
changed to make mergers easier; while 11 percent say a 
change is needed to make mergers more difficult. 
"I don't think there's any simple answer to that question," 
one director said. "Some profound thinking and writing have 
been done on the subject. I'm inclined to let merger activity 
continue at about the same rate, with government giving a 
constant but fair review of the antitrust results. Government 
should also remain flexible, because it's a delicate area." 
In the belief that large corporations have too much political 
power, Senator Edward Kennedy and others have advocated 
legislation aimed at preventing further concentration of 
power by restraining mergers between large companies. 
Respondents to the survey neither agree with the premise 
nor support the proposed remedy (Table 22). Eighty-two per-
cent deny that large corporations have too much political 
power, and 80 percent oppose legislation restraining mergers 
between large companies. However, some respondents, by 
subscribing to one proposition but not both, demonstrate 
that the two are not necessarily linked. It is possible to 
believe that large corporations have too much political power 
without supporting legislation against large mergers, and 
possible to support such legislation for reasons other than 
preventing the concentration of political power. "A plain, 
objective size test could become valid at some point," said 
one director. "DuPont can't merge with Allied Chemical 
under antitrust, but I wouldn't like to see it merge with 
Westinghouse either." Another said: "Yes, some corporations 
probably have a great deal of political power. But today, it's 
very difficult for them to exercise that power irresponsibly. I 
don't think the power of corporations is a persuasive reason 
for preventing large mergers." 
"All power has grown in the twentieth century," one 
Table 21 
How should government affect regulation of mergers? 
Permit them to stay the same 54% 
Make them less difficult 35% 
Make them more difficult 11% 
Table 22 
Many legislators and social observers argue that large companies have too much 
political power. As a result, they want the government to prohibit or severely limit 
mergers that significantly increase the economic size of large companies. 
Yes No 
Are you concerned that some corporations 
have too much political power? 18% 82% 
Do you agree that larger mergers should be 
severely constrained because of size? 20 80 
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director mused. "Do I want the government to have more 
power? I'm not sure. Do I want corporations to have more 
power? I'm not sure of that either. Has government shown 
that it can run businesses better than private people? I don't 
think so. Do very large companies ever abuse their power? 
Yes. It's an awfully tough question." 
In January 1980 the SEC adopted the requirement that 
tender offers remain open for a minimum of twenty business 
days. The commission also proposed that the waiting period 
be extended to thirty business days. Eighty-seven percent of 
the survey respondents favor the extension (Table 23), and 
many say that thirty days is still not time enough. "Thirty 
days for resolving the issues of corporate marriage is 
absurd," one director said. "Would you approve of your 
daughter marrying a man after dating him for only thirty 
days?" 
Another director, just completing a study of this subject 
when he was reached by phone, provided some striking 
information. Until January 1980, the minimum waiting 
period was seven to ten days, but a variety of delaying tactics 
kept most hostile tender offers open much longer. The study, 
which covered all of the hostile, competitive tender offers 
from November 1974 through December 1979, found that if 
bidding had closed at the end of the minimum waiting period, 
stockholders would have been deprived of 83 percent of 
the bids and 85 percent of the premiums that did, in fact, 
subsequently develop. Even if the bidding had closed after 
forty-five days, 34 percent of the bids and 51 percent of the 
premiums would have been headed off. 
If thirty days is still too short a period, how long should 
an offer stay open? "I'd say somewhere between thirty and 
ninety days," answered one director. "Long enough for a 
company to think about the offer and decide whether to 
accept it or seek other bids, but not too long for the would-be 
acquirer to keep its money and people tied up." 
Siding with the respondents who oppose any extension of 
the waiting period, another director said: "Twenty business 
days is plenty of time. The disruption of normal business 
is so severe that the company could go to hell in a hand-
basket if it had to wait much longer." 
Table 23 
The SEC has proposed that tender offers remain open a minimum of thirty 
business days. By lengthening the current twenty-day waiting period, this rule 
would give target companies more time to look for white knights or to prepare 
other defenses. 
Yes No 
Do you favor this proposal? 87% 13% 
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Section 6 
THE SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
Most of the 217 directors who participated in the survey have 
had extensive experience as corporate directors, and this 
experience has included involvement in several mergers, 
most of them friendly acquisitions. 
Sixty-five percent of the survey respondents have been 
directors for more than ten years, and 23 percent have been 
directors for over twenty years (Table 24). 
M ore than half of the respondents currently serve on three 
or more boards. Eighteen percent are directors of just one 
company, while 31 percent are directors of five or more 
(Table 25). 
Eighty-six percent of the respondents have been on the 
board of a company that made at least one acquisition in 
the last five years, and of this group four out of five have 
experienced at least two acquisitions (Table 26). Thirty-six 
percent have been involved as directors in at least five 
acquisitions, and some say they have seen as many as forty 
or fifty. Most of these acquisitions by far were described as 
friendly. Only 6 percent of the group that have been involved 
as directors with acquisitions said that any of the acquisi-
tions were hostile. 
Table 24 
How long have you been a corporate director? 
1-5 years 12% 
6-10 years 23% 
11 -20 years 42% 
Over 20 years 23% 
Table 25 
On how many corporate boards do you now serve? 
One board 18% 
Two boards 22% 
Three boards 15% 
Four boards 14% 
Over four boards 31 % 
Table 26 
Has a company on whose board you serve acquired another company within the 
last five years? 
Yes 86% 
No 14% 
If yes, how many companies were taken over? 
Two or more 80% 
Five or more 36% 
Have any of these takeovers been hostile? 
Yes 6% 
No 94% 
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Less than half of the respondents, 44 percent, have served 
on the board of a takeover target (Table 27). 
Fifty-seven percent of the respondents serve on the board of 
the company for which they work (Table 28). Seventy-three 
(59 percent) of the inside directors are CEOs. Thus, CEOs 
account for 34 percent of all respondents. 
In functional experience, most of the respondents describe 
themselves as general managers, with many also indicating 
a second field of expertise, frequently finance (Table 29). 
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Table 27 
Have you served on the board of a company while it was the target of a takeover 
attempt? 
Yes 44% 
No 56% 
Table 28 
Do you serve on the board of the company for which you work? 
Yes 57% 
No 43 
If yes, are you the CEO? 
Yes 59% 
No 41 
Table 29 
What is your functional or occupational experience? 
Number of 
Responses 
Number of 
Responses 
General management 118 Law within a corporation 18 
Finance 77 Outside law firm 17 
Marketing 33 Investment banking 17 
Engineering or research 26 Accounting and auditing 12 
Manufacturing 21 Other 21 
Commercial banking 19 
NOTE: Many respondents checked more than one area of experience. 
